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I. INTRODUCTION
The "presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law,
axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the
administration of our criminal law."' This basic principle, which has prevailed
within our judicial system since its beginning, is grounded in the fundamental and
humane maxims of Roman law. 2 Judicial adherence to the presumption of innoncence
had been particularly valuable for pretrial detainees 3 who were imprisoned and
awaiting trial. 4 Until recently, courts held that restrictions imposed on rights "beyond
those [constraints] which [were] necessary for confinement alone, [had to] be
justified by a compelling necessity." 5 This compelling necessity standard employed
by the courts ensured that a pretrial detainee's presumed innocence would not be
doubted or overlooked. Recently, however, in Bell v. Wolfish, the Supreme Court
discarded the compelling necessity standard. 6 By rejecting the "undoubted law,'' 7
considered for almost a century as "the foundation of the administration of our
criminal law," 8 the Court provided a judicial precedent that would be used in two
1984 decisions to undercut the ideal of the presumption of innocence. In Block v.
Rutherford9 and Schall v. Martin,10 pretrial detainees were clearly excepted from the
protection of the presumption of innocence, and are now vulnerable to the discretion
of prison officials, to whom courts accord a great deal of deference. This inroad into
the principle of the presumption of innocence has led the United States criminal
justice system away from the humane and fundamental principles to which it should
always adhere.
II. HISTORY OF THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
In Coffin v. United States,1 the United States Supreme Court traced the
presumption of innocence to an anecdote of the Emperor Julian that illustrated the
Roman philosophy behind this principle. Numerius, the governor of Narbonensis,
was on trial before the Emperor, and, contrary to the custom in criminal cases, the
trial was public. Numerius denied guilt, and there was not sufficient proof against
him. His adversary, Delphidius, "a passionate man," seeing that the failure of the
1. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895).
2. Id. at 454.
3. Pretrial detainees are "unconvicted individuals awaiting trial, held... because they could not post bail."
Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 122 n.6 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd sub nom. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
4. See Detainees of the Brooklyn House of Detention for Men v. Malcolm, 520 F.2d 392, 397 (2d Cir. 1975).
5. Id.
6. 441 U.S. 520, 532-35 (1979).
7. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895).
8. Id.
9. 468 U.S. 576 (1984).
10. 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
11. 156 U.S. 432 (1895).
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accusation was inevitable, could not restrain himself and exclaimed, "[O]h,
illustrious Caesar! if it is sufficient to deny, what hereafter will become of the
guilty?" to which Julian replied, "[I]f it suffices to accuse, what will become of the
innocent?" 12
Mindful of this anecdote, the Court in Coffin reiterated that doubt requires
acquittal or freedom from the ramifications of a guilty verdict. 13 Therefore, it follows
that a pretrial detainee remains within the protective scope of the presumption of
innocence until a guilty verdict is rendered at trial. 14 When there is doubt, a cloak of
presumed innocence shields and protects those who are vulnerable to legal processes
pending a final adjudication.
To illustrate the importance of the presumption of innocence within the early
common-law doctrines, the Court in Coffin quoted three English scholars whose
interpretation and articulation of legal principles lie at the foundation of contemporary
jurisprudence. A careful analysis of these quotes demonstrates that the presumption
of innocence should be afforded equally to everyone in society.
First, the Court quoted Lord Hale to illustrate that legal systems must be com-
mitted to fairness and to the protection of presumed innocence, even if this protection
frees those who may be guilty. "In some cases presumptive [evidence goes] far to
prove a person guilty, though there be no express proof of the fact to be committed
by him, but then it must be very warily pressed, for it is better five guilty persons should
escape unpunished[] than one innocent person should die.' ' 5 Lord Hale's words
emphasized that regardless of the cost, the preservation of an individual's presumed
innocence and dignity should be paramount within humane societies.
Second, the Court in Coffin cited Blackstone's Commentaries to further
highlight the common-law perceptions of presumed innocence. Blackstone rephrased
the principle espoused by Lord Hale, with one notable change. He stated: "[Tihe lav
holds[] that it is better that ten guilty persons escape[] than that one innocent
suffer."' 16 Thus, death does not have to be imminent for the courts to protect the
presumption of innocence. Mere suffering by one who may be free from guilt is
enough to invoke the harshest scrutiny.
Third, the Court cited McKinley's Case17 in which Lord Gillies noted the
pervasive nature of the presumption of innocence.
I conceive that this presumption is to be found in every code of law which has reason, and
religion, and humanity, for a foundation. It is a maxim which ought to be inscribed in
indelible characters in the heart of every judge .... To overturn this, there must be legal
evidence of guilt, carrying home a degree of conviction short only of absolute certainty."
12. Id. at 455 (citing A. Mscmlmus, 1 REtus GEsrARt, Book 18.
13. 156 U.S. 432, 460 (1895).
14. A pretrial detainee's "traditional right to freedom before conviction permits the unhampered preparation of a
defense, and serves to prevent the infliction of punishment prior to conviction." Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951)
(emphasis added). But see 9 WIGMORE, EvanEcs § 2511 (Chadboum rev. 1981) (presumption of innocence allocates the
burden of proof as a principle of evidence).
15. 156 U.S. 432, 456 (quoting 2 M. Ha, THE HEroRY OF THE PLEAS oF ThE CROWN *289).
16. Id. (quoting 4 W. BLAcsToNE, Co'msrAwEs *358) (emphasis added).
17. 33 St. Trials 275 (Scot. H.C.J. 1817).
18. 156 U.S. 432, 456 (1895) (quoting 33 St. Trials 275, 506).
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The early Roman and English law doctrines, then, were committed to the
preservation of the presumption of innocence and focused on a "devotion to human
liberty and individual rights."' 19 In many areas of the law, the United States judicial
system has left this fundamental presumption intact. 20 Although courts fought to
preserve the vitality of the presumption of innocence for pretrial detainees until the
1970s,2 1 recent judicial decisions have stripped pretrial detainees of this fundamental
right.22 Without the presumption of innocence, courts fail to protect the valuable
rights of detained suspects prior to any adjudication of their guilt.
II. THE PREsUMPTION OF INNOCENCE FOR DErAINEES PRIOR TO Bell v.
Wolfish
Prior to Bell v. Wolfish,2 3 the judiciary demonstrated a commitment to the rights
of pretrial detainees by strictly adhering to the presumption of innocence. This policy
offered little deference to prison administrators in handling detainees. To be
legitimate, restrictions on detainee's rights had to be justified by a compelling
necessity.
The frequently cited case Detainees of the Brooklyn House of Detention For Men
v. Malcolm2 4 applies the stringent compelling necessity test. In Malcolm, two
consolidated civil rights actions were brought before the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of New York by the inmates of the Brooklyn and Queens
Houses of Detention.2 5 The inmates alleged that inhumane and unsanitary living
conditions and administrative practices at the two facilities were unconstitutional. 2 6
Particularly at issue were the practices of "double-celling" 2 7 and "excessive
confinement of detainees in their 5' x 8' cells each day." 28 The district court enjoined
the confinement of two detainees in a single-occupancy cell, and the defendants
appealed.2 9 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, 30 specifically
delineating the compelling necessity test.3' According to this test, prison officials
must demonstrate that regulations depriving detainees of certain rights are premised
on a compelling necessity to secure prison safety. The court reasoned that pretrial
detainees, because of the presumption of innocence, had the same rights as bailees
and other ordinary citizens. The only restrictions on these rights that might be
19. Id. at 460.
20. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951) (right to bail must be preserved prior to conviction if the presumption
of innocence is to be preserved); Agnew v. United States, 165 U.S. 36 (1897) (prosecution has burden of proving
defendant's guilt in a criminal case and overcoming the presumption of innocence).
21. See infra notes 24-39 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 82-98 and accompanying text.
23. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
24. 520 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1975).
25. Id. at 392-93.
26. Id. at 393.
27. "Double-ceiling" means putting two inmates in a single-occupancy cell.
28. 520 F.2d 392, 394 (2d Cir. 1975).
29. Id. at 393.
30. Id. at 399.
31. Id. at 397.
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tolerated were those necessary to assure the detainee's presence at trial and to assure
prison security. 32
In determining what constituted a compelling necessity, courts were protective
of individual rights and sought to invoke sympathetic policies favoring detainees. For
instance, in Marcera v. Chinlund,33 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that
neither administrative inconvenience nor economic constraints were compelling
necessities that would allow prison administrators to restrict detainees' rights.
[I]t is unconstitutional to deny inmates regular contact visits while they are incarcerated
awaiting trial. This right is founded on the bedrock of our criminal jurisprudence: an
individual accused of a crime is presumed innocent, and may not be punished, until a jury
finds him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 4
Thus, the presumption of innocence was considered an aspect of detainees'
constitutional rights.
In Inmates of Milwaukee County Jail v. Petersen,35 pretrial detainees of the
Milwaukee County Jail sought to challenge the constitutionality of the jail's
"practices and conditions." ' 36 Specifically at issue were four aspects of the prison
environment: disciplinary procedures, limitations and censorship of incoming and
outgoing mail, regulation of reading material, and telephone usage restrictions. 37 The
court held that the detainees' rights were being violated, stating that the "policies and
procedures presently in effect at the Milwaukee County jail offend the first and
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution .... "38 The Court
emphasized these reasons for the extensive judicial protection afforded to those
charged with offenses and merely awaiting trial:
First, the issues presented in this case concern the fundamental rights of true pretrial
detainees only. It must be borne in mind that these are not people who have been
convicted and sentenced tojail; they are persons who have been charged with offenses and
are entitled to the presumption of innocence. They are incarcerated solely because of their
inability to post bail.
Second, as individuals who have not been convicted of [a] crime, they retain all
rights retained by arrestees who have been released on bail, except for the curtailment of
mobility deemed necessary ... to protect the security of the institution in which they are
detained. 39
In Petersen, the compelling necessity test was the accepted standard for
upholding the presumption of innocence, and the court compared detainees with
bailees who were merely awaiting trial without any restrictions on their mobility.
32. Id.
33. 595 F.2d 1231 (2d Cir. 1979), vacated sub noma. Lombard v. Marcera, 442 U.S. 915 (1979).
34. Id. at 1237 (quoting Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 124 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd sub nom. Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520 (1979) and Detainees of the Brooklyn House of Detention for Men v. Malcolm, 520 F.2d 392, 399 (2d Cir.
1975)) (brackets in original).
35. 353 F. Supp. 1157 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
36. Id. at 1159.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1169; see also Tyrrell v. Taylor, 394 F. Supp. 9, 19 (E.D. Pa. 1975), modified sub noa. United States
ex rel. Tyrrell v. Speaker, 535 F.2d 823 (3d Cir. 1976).
39. 353 F. Supp. 1157, 1159-60 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
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Malcolm, Marcera, and Petersen were consistent with the early Roman and
common-law doctrines. These cases demonstrated a commitment to the principle of
the presumption of innocence by protecting the rights of pretrial detainees against all
unnecessary restrictions.
Jones v. Diamond4° represented an important turning point in the law as it
applied to pretrial detainees. In Diamond, the inmates of the Jackson County Jail
alleged thirteen violations of their constitutional rights: "right to recreation,
overcrowding, right to adequate medical care, visitation, utilization of trusties, racial
segregation, right to an adequate diet, right to uncensored communication, right to
fair disciplinary proceedings, a proper classification system, right to protection
(inmate security), physical facilities, and right to access to the courts."' a Exhibiting
great deference to prison officials, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
"evidence did not establish that [the] Jackson County, Mississippi jail was unfit for
human habitation .... ",42
Diamond limited the scope of the presumption of innocence as it applied to
pretrial detainees. Instead of focusing on the absence of a conviction, Diamond
focused on the probable guilt of detainees, and thus, the need for judicial deference
to prison officials who represent the governmental interest and who protect the public
at large. Specifically, the court stated, "Pretrial detainees have not yet been
convicted of any offense and are accorded the presumption of innocence when
brought to trial, but the fact remains that they are being held on probable cause to
believe that they are, in fact, guilty of a violation of the criminal statutes." '43 This
restrictive application of the doctrine established the groundwork for Bell v. Wolfish44
and encouraged a judicial tolerance for prison actions premised on probable guilt
rather than on presumed innocence.
IV. Bell v. Wolfish
In Bell v. Wolfish 45 the United States Supreme Court abolished the compelling
necessity test as it applied to pretrial detainees. Wolfish concerned allegedly
unconstitutional conditions in Manhattan's pretrial detention facility known as the
Metropolitan Correctional Center (MCC). 46 Even though MCC was acclaimed as the
"best and most progressive" 47 detention facility, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals held that its "double-bunking" procedure was unconstitutional because no
40. 594 F.2d 997 (5th Cir. 1979).
41. Id. at 1005-06. A definition of "trusties" can be found id. at 1020-21 n. 22.
42. Id. at 997.
43. Id. at 1003-04. For other instances of judicial deference to prison officials, see Procunier v. Martinez, 416
U.S. 396 (1974) and Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974) (restrictions on first amendment rights imposed
by prison officials on inmates to be analyzed in light of the goals of the correctional system); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S.
215 (1976) (Court held that no hearing is required before an inmate is transferred to another institution with inferior
conditions); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 125 (1977) (courts must recognize the
restrictive and unique circumstances of prison environment and give appropriate deference to decisions of officials).
44. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
45. Id. at 524.
46. Id. at 523.
47. Id. at 525 (citing Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 121 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'dsub nom. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520 (1979)).
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compelling state interest could justify subjecting presumptively innocent detainees to
this inhumane treatment.4 The Supreme Court reversed, limiting the presumption of
innocence to a burden of proof doctrine at trial. 49 The Court focused not on innocence
but on the question whether the prison conditions constituted punishment, reasoning
that due process requires only that detainees be free from punishment.50 The Court
stressed the policy advantages of judicial deference to prison officials who are
seeking to achieve reasonable and legitimate goals. 51
Wolfish provided a rare opportunity for the Court to support the presumption of
innocence doctrine, with the compelling necessity test, or to develop a new standard
for addressing the unique problems confronting pretrial detainees. The Court chose
the latter. Three important aspects of the decision highlight the fundamental changes
in the long-established doctrine of the presumption of innocence and the compelling
necessity test, as it was applied previously to pretrial detainees. 52
First, the Court rejected any notion that the presumption of innocence doctrine
required that the compelling necessity test be applied, as a lower court held earlier in
Inmates of Milwaukee County Jail v. Petersen.53 By separating the two doctrines, the
Court could then proceed to redefine and restructure their application in pretrial
detainee settings. The Court stated:
Our fundamental disagreement with the Court of Appeals is that we fail to find a source
in the Constitution for its compelling-necessity standard. Both the Court of Appeals and
the District Court seem to have relied on the "presumption of innocence" as the source
of the detainee's substantive right to be free from conditions of confinement that are not
justified by compelling necessity. But the presumption of innocence provides no support
for such a ruleA4
Thus, the Court effectively overruled the Second Circuit Malcolm case, which
strongly advocated the stringent compelling necessity test.
Second, the Court, now treating the presumption of innocence as a separate
doctrine, applied it differently within the pretrial detainee context. 55 Although noting
the importance of the presumption within the legal system, the Court attempted to
reconcile this with the inequitable treatment of detainees by stressing the special
circumstances of their confinement, which purportedly exempted them from the
48. Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 126 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd sub noma. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
49. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979).
50. Id. at 535.
51. Id. at 538-39.
52. See Comment, The Constitutional Right of Pretrial Detainees: A Healthy Sense of Realism?, 41 Oieo ST. L.J.
1087, 1098-99 (1980).
53. 353 F. Supp. 1157 (E.D. Wis. 1973); see supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text.
54. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 532 (1979) (footnote omitted). But see id. at 569-70 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(proposing an inquiry into whether the government interest outweighed the individual deprivation suffered. Marshall
believed his analysis to be more consistent with due process requirements).
55. See Note, Constitutional Law-Criminal Law-Pretrial Detainees May Be Subjected to Conditions of
Confinement Reasonably Related to Legitimate Government Objectives-Bell v. Wolfish, 1979 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1022,
1027-33. The Note provides a valuable analysis of the Court's movement from a compelling necessity standard of review
in detainee eases toward a review based on the necessity of showing only a reasonable relationship between the restrictive
prison condition imposed and the government interest at stake.
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blanket application of the presumption of innocence within more general areas of the
law.
Without question, the presumption of innocence plays an important role in our criminal
justice system. "The principle that there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the
accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the
foundation of the administration of our criminal law." But it has no application to a
determination of the rights of a pretrial detainee during confinement before his trial has
even begun.56
The Court in Wolfish attempted to satisfy those critical of the decision by
reaffirming the principles enunciated in Coffin v. United States.57 The majority
emphasized that the presumption of innocence is a basic principle of the law, but the
Court did not apply it equally to all citizens. 58 Wolfish abandoned, in one rapid
stroke, the presumption of innocence after Coffin, Petersen,5 9 Marcera,6 ° and
Malcolm6' had established precedents which were followed for decades to insure the
purity and consistent application of the doctrine.
The third important aspect of the Wolfish decision was its reformulation of the
test used for evaluating prison action. The Court shifted from a compelling necessity
standard to a reasonableness standard for evaluating prison officials' actions. The
Court held that restrictions on pretrial detainees could not constitute punishment. This
was explained as follows:
The factors identified ... provide useful guideposts in determining whether particular
restrictions and conditions accompanying pretrial detention amount to punishment in the
constitutional sense of that word. A court must decide whether the disability is imposed
for the purpose of punishment or whether it is but an incident of some other legitimate
governmental purpose. Absent a showing of an expressed intent to punish on the part of
the detention facility officials, that determination generally will turn on "whether an
alternative purpose to which [the restriction] may rationally be connected is assignable for
it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned [to it]."62
Thus, the test applied by the Court to assess the constitutionality of prison actions that
restrict detainees' rights focused on reasonableness, rational objectives, and legiti-
macy.
The Court justified this policy of increased deference to prison officials with
concepts of prison official expertise, separation of powers, and judicial ignorance of
prison concerns. The extent of this deference was emphasized by the Court when the
majority stated:
56. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979) (quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895)).
57. 156 U.S. 432 (1895).
58. See Comment, Constitutional Law-Pretrial Detention-Due Process-Bell v. Wolfish, 26 N.Y.L. ScH. L.
REv. 341, 354-55 (1981).
59. 353 F. Supp. 1157 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
60. 595 F.2d 1231 (2d Cir. 1979), vacated sub nom. Lombard v. Marcera, 442 U.S. 915 (1979).
61. 520 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1975).
62. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979) (footnote omitted) (brackets in original) (quoting Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963)); see also Note, Constitutional Limitations on Body Searches in
Prisons, 82 CoLw. L. REv. 1033, 1033-37 (1982).
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Judges, after all, are human. They, no less than others in our society, have a natural
tendency to believe that their individual solutions to often intractable problems are better
and more workable than those of the persons who are actually charged with and trained
in the running of the particular institution under examination. But under the Constitution,
the first question to be answered is not whose plan is best, but in what branch of the
Government is lodged the authority to initially devise the plan.63
After Wolfish, it is questionable when, if ever, courts will have the power to
examine prison action that may be violative of detainees' constitutional rights. 64
Also, it is doubtful whether the judiciary will ever return to the Roman-inspired ideal
of presumed innocence that Coffin invoked to protect everyone equally. 65
V. THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE FOLLOWING Bell v. Wolfish
It is important to note the new standards applied by courts in pretrial detainee cases
after Wolfish. The remainder of this Note will examine decisions adhering to Wolfish,
those deviating from it in an attempt to favor prisoners, and later Supreme Court
decisions which reflect the new standard of judicial deference to the expertise of prison
officials. Additionally, this Note will seek to propose solutions which address and
remedy the Wolfish disregard for traditional notions of presumption of innocence.
The most noticeable change in the decisions that followed Wolfish was the
application of a new judicial deference to prison officials by the lower courts. Two
cases illustrate this point.
In Sistrunk v. Lyons, 66 the plaintiff alleged that his excessive bail "abridged the
presumption of innocence." 67 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit referred to
Wolfish in denying Sistrunk habeas corpus relief.
In the wake of Bell v. Wolfish, it would appear that pretrial detainees can no longer
predicate constitutional challenges on the presumption of innocence.... [T]he Court
stated that despite the important role the presumption of innocence plays in the criminal
justice system, "it has no application to a determination of the rights of a pretrial detainee
during confinement before his trial has even begun."
68
Thus, the court in Lyons explicitly recognized the Wolfish premise that pretrial
detainees are not entitled to the presumption of innocence. Without challenging the
Supreme Court's disregard for the treasured ideal of innocence, the Lyons decision
illustrated that any hope of returning to fundamental notions of humanity and dignity
within the pretrial detainee context may indeed be futile. 69
The second case that illustrated the new judicial deference given to prison officials
was Rutherford v. Pitchess.70 In Rutherford, inmates of the Los Angeles Jail chal-
lenged practices and procedures concerning, among other things, contact visits and cell
63. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562 (1979).
64. See Comment, supra note 52, at 1110-11.
65. Id. at 1104.
66. 646 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1981).
67. Id. at 71.
68. Id. at 71 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979)).
69. See also The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, 93 HAv. L. REv. 60, 105 (1979).
70. 710 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd sub nom. Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576 (1984).
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searches. 71 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court
decision in part when it "allowed low-risk detainees to have one contact visit per
week" 72 and to witness cell searches. 73 This decision cited Wolfish for the proposition
that "authority to make policy choices concerning prisons is not a proper judicial
function." 74 Rutherford emphasized the separation of powers and judicial deference
doctrines outlined in Wolfish, and limited its scope of review based on these doctrines.
Nonetheless, Rutherford did offer some hope for pretrial detainees. After
stating a principle of deference to prison officials, the court in Rutherford adhered to
a balancing test in pretrial detainee cases. 75 Although the Court in Wolfish purported
to examine prison officials' actions by employing a reasonableness test, in reality its
decision reflected little concern for detainees' rights. Instead, judicial deference to
prison authorities seemed paramount. Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit attempted to
examine the validity of prison officials' actions in relation to detainee rights, rather
than in relation to allegedly legitimate prison concerns. Although the court stated
that it was upholding the mandates of Wolfish, it appeared to shift the focus back to
the detainees' rights, which were not truly considered in Wolfish.
A court confronted with challenges to prison practices therefore faces an important and
difficult task. To fulfill the Supreme Court's mandate under Wolfish, it must explore and
analyze ... competing sets of needs and objectives-the penal institution's interest in
institutional administration and security and the detainee's interest in protecting and
exercising his retained constitutional rights. Only after such a thorough review can a court
decide whether or not a particular prison condition is an unreasonable, exaggerated
response to the legitimate nonpunitive objectives of a detention facility. 76
Because the court in Rutherford emphasized thorough judicial review of prison
practices, it apparently departed from the Wolfish mandate which advocated a
"hands-off" attitude toward prison authority. Additionally, the court challenged
actions that restricted detainees' rights by applying strict scrutiny to test their
constitutionality. However, this retreat from Wofish was rejected one year later by
the Supreme Court when it reversed the Rutherford decision. 77
The Supreme Court first returned to the issue of pretrial detainees' rights in
Hewitt v. Helms,78 when the Court, as in Wolfish, clearly approved the principle of
judicial deference to prison officials, saying "Prison administrators.., should be
accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and
practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline
and to maintain institutional security," 79 and, "We have repeatedly said both that
prison officials have broad administrative and discretionary authority over the
71. Id. at 574.
72. Id. at 577.
73. Id. at 579.
74. Id. at 575.
75. Id.
76. Id. (emphasis added).
77. Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576 (1984).
78. 459 U.S. 460 (1983).
79. Id. at 472 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979)).
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institution they manage and that lawfully incarcerated persons retain only a narrow
range of protected liberty interests." 80 The Court in Hewitt did not concern itself with
the balancing of interests or with a thorough review. Rather, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed, five years after Wolfish, that judicial deference to the prison authorities
who regulate detainees' rights is the paramount concern.
The Supreme Court reversed Rutherford v. Pitchessel one year after Hewitt, in
Block v. Rutherford.8 2 In Block, the Court made it clear that the Ninth Circuit's
attempt to retreat from the mandates of Wolfish was not to be tolerated. The Court
reiterated the principle that prison officials are to be "accorded wide-ranging
deference" in order to maintain prison security.8 3
When examining the extent of the judicial deference advocated in Block, it is
disheartening to note that the Court once again entrusted prison officials with the duty
of balancing the need for legitimate prison action with detainees' constitutional rights
and presumed innocence. The Court appeared to apply Wolfish to justify a complete
abdication of any duty to protect pretrial detainees from the whims of prison officials.
"[P]roper deference to the informed discretion of prison authorities demands that
they, and not the courts, make the difficult judgments which reconcile conflicting
claims affecting the security of the institution, the welfare of the prison staff, and the
property rights of the detainees."84
Two passages from the dissenting opinion illustrate the oppressive nature of the
majority opinion. First, the dissent noted:
Guided by an unwarranted confidence in the good faith and "expertise" of prison
administrators and by a pinched conception of the meaning of the Due Process Clauses
and the Eighth Amendment, a majority of the Court increasingly appears willing to
sanction any prison condition for which they can imagine a colorable rationale, no matter
how oppressive or ill justified that condition is in fact.8s
The dissent emphasized that the expertise of prison officials was questionable, that
deference to prison authorities when constitutional rights were at stake was
unwarranted, and that the scrutiny of the Court should have been at its highest with
the implication of due process concerns. Clearly, the dissent desired to rescue the
balancing process from the hands of prison officials and wanted the Court to weigh
the factors that determine the validity of prison action.
The second passage in the dissent, which breathed a small breath of life into the
presumption of innocence and the compelling necessity test, appeared to advocate a
return to the analysis that the district court adhered to in Inmates of Milwaukee County
Jail v. Petersen:86
80. Id. at 467.
81. 710 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd sub nom. Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576 (1984).
82. 468 U.S. 576 (1984), rev'g Rutherford v. Pitchess, 710 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. 1983).
83. Id. at __, 104 S. Ct. at 3232 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979)).
84. Id. at __ , 104 S. Ct. at 3235 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 557 n.38 (1979)).
85. Id. at - , 104 S. Ct. at 3238 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
86. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
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[T]wo factors suggest that only a very important public purpose could sustain the policy.
First, even persons lawfully incarcerated after being convicted of crimes retain important
constitutional rights; presumptively innocent persons surely are entitled to no less.
Second, we have previously insisted upon very persuasive justifications for government
regulations that significantly, but not prohibitively, interfered with the exercise of familial
rights; arguably, a similarly stringent test should control here.... At a minimum,
petitioners, to prevail, should be required to show that the Jail's policy materially
advances a substantial government interest.87
The dissent struggled to retain the presumption of innocence for detainees and
attempted to bring the balancing operation back into the courts, which might demand
a more substantial or compelling governmental objective. Despite this commendable
attempt to revive the presumption of innocence and the compelling necessity test set
forth in Malcolm,83 the majority in Block held that: "[The] petitioners' blanket
prohibition is an entirely reasonable, nonpunitive response to the legitimate security
concerns identified, consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment.''89
For those advocates who oppose the Court's stance in Wolfish,90 this decision is
yet another blow to the fundamental and humane aspects of the legal system. Clearly,
the dissent in Block offers hope to those who continue to support the ideals espoused
in Petersen,9 1 Malcolm,92 and Marcera;93 but this hope may indeed be futile.
Another decision premised on the deference doctrine established by Wolfish was
Schall v. Martin.94 In Schall, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a
New York Family Court act that allowed a delinquent accused of committing a crime
to be detained upon a finding of serious risk that the child "may before the return date
commit an act which if committed by an adult would constitute a crime.' -
The Court upheld the statute by employing the premise of Wolfsh that encourages
judicial deference: "A court must decide whether the disability is imposed for the
purpose of punishment or whether it is but an incident of some other legitimate
governmental purpose. "96 The Court did appear, however, to emphasize that complete
deference is not mandated by Wolfish. Indeed, the majority appeared to be balancing
the merits of the New York Family Court act on its own, without turning to the prison
authorities' unfettered discretion. Nonetheless, it must be noted that neither the
presumption of innocence nor the compelling necessity test was ever alluded to within
the opinion. In Schall, unlike in Block,97 the presumption of innocence yielded not only
to an inference of past guilt, but also to the possibility of future guilt. Clearly, this
extension of judicial deference to state prison systems renders constitutional protec-
87. 468 U.S. 762, , 104 S. Ct. 3227, 3240 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis
added).
88. 520 F.2d 392, 397 (2d Cir. 1975); see supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text.
89. 468 U.S. 762, _ , 104 S. Ct. 3227, 3234 (1984).
90. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
91. Inmates of Milwaukee County Jail v. Petersen, 353 F. Supp. 1157 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
92. Detainees of the Brooklyn House of Detention for Men v. Malcolm, 520 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1975).
93. Marcera v. Chinlund, 595 F.2d 1231 (2d Cir. 1979), vacated sub nom. Lombard v. Marcera, 442 U.S. 915
(1979).
94. 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
95. Id. at 255 (quoting N.Y. Fas. CT. Acr. § 320.5(3)(b) (McKinney 1983)).
96. Id. at 269 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979)).
97. Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576 (1984).
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tions useless to those individuals who look to the powerful few who control detention
centers, when seeking redress for rights grievances.
Once again, the weary advocate of the presumption of innocence and the
compelling necessity test found shelter within the dissent. Although representing the
views of a minority of the Court, the dissenting opinion again offered some hope for
those with an eye toward the future:
Only in occasional cases does incarceration of a juvenile pending his trial serve to prevent
a crime of violence and thereby significantly promote the public interest. Such an
infrequent and haphazard gain is insufficient to justify curtailment of the liberty interests
of all the presumptively innocent juveniles who would have obeyed the law pending their
trials had they been given the chance.98
In both Schall and Block then, the Wolfish rationale prevails. The doctrine of
judicial deference to prison administration expertise continues to guide the Court in
a manner that ignores the traditional value of presumed innocence. Those individuals
who choose to protect the liberty interests of pretrial detainees must resort to the
arguments proposed by the dissenting minority of the Supreme Court in Block and
Schall.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Roman-inspired principle of the presumption of innocence and the compel-
ling necessity test of Malcolm99 no longer receive judicial cognizance after Wolf-
ish. t°° The Court instead advocates a policy of deference to prison officials even at
the cost of undermining precious constitutional rights. The United States allegedly
seeks to uphold and adhere to judicial philosophies that ensure the preservation of
individual rights. Indeed, the United States' international reputation is built on a
foundation that supports and protects an individual's right to a presumption of
innocence before conviction, and which protects an individual who might otherwise
succumb to unconstitutional regulatory schemes. Yet by abandoning the compelling
necessity test previously required to justify prison officials' actions restricting
detainees' constitutional rights, the Court belies this reputation in the area of pretrial
detainment. Prison officials cannot be trusted to protect individual rights. The Court
must retrieve the discretion it so easily surrendered to prison administrators in
Wolfish. Until the Court uses its power to protect the individual rights of pretrial
detainees, however, those who adhere to the fundamental doctrines of Blackstone,
Lord Hale, and Lord Gillies must look to the dissenting few on the Supreme Court.
May the search for a judicial perspective premised on the humane and fundamental
legal values of the past not always appear so fruitless.
Cathy Lynne Bosworth
98. 467 U.S. 297-98 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
99. Detainees of the Brooklyn House of Detention for Men v. Malcolm, 520 F. 2d 392 (2d Cir. 1975).
100. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
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